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MORE THAN A CONGRESSIONAL JOKE: A FRESH LOOK
AT THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
OF THE 1964 CIVIL RIGHTS ACT
ROBERT C. BiRD"
INTRODUCTION
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Act) represents one of the most
significant milestones of the twentieth century.' Title VII of the
Act prohibits discrimination in employment on the basis of "race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin."2 The Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission (EEOC) was subsequently created to
define and enforce the Title VII provisions.8
Conventional wisdom holds that Congress added a sex
discrimination provision to Title VII as little more than a "joke"4
or a political ploy. Many authors dismiss the legislative history
of the sex discrimination prohibition as aberrant congressional
behavior, which is largely to be ignored. The following passage
illustrates the usual cursory analysis:
The statute's prohibition on gender discrimination was a last
minute addition, made through an amendment on the floor of
the House of Representatives. The amendment, adding "sex"
to Title VII's list of prohibited bases for discrimination, was
proposed by conservative opponents of the civil rights
legislation who believed that it would lead to the defeat of
the entire bill.5
Law Clerk, Massachusetts Superior Court 1996-97; M.B.A. Candidate, Boston Uni-
versity; J.D., 1996, Boston University School of Law. My thanks for comments and support
to members of the Academy of Legal Studies in Business, 1996 Annual Conference, at
which I presented an earlier version of this Article. All errors and omissions are my own.
1. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1988).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(aX1X1988).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e.4 (1988); Kerry A. Colson, Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.: The
Supreme Court Moves One Step Closer to Establishing A Workable Definition for Hostile
Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims, 30 NEw ENG. L. REv. 441, 447 n.41 (1996)
('The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is a bipartisan commission that
Congress created to administer and enforce discrimination claims under Title VII").
4. Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 428 n.36 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
("This Court -like all Title VII enthusiasts -is well aware that the sex discrimination
prohibition was added to Title VII as a joke by the notorious civil rights opponent Howard
W. Smith. But the joke backfired on Smith when the amendment was adopted on the floor
of the House . . .") (citing Francis J. Vaas, Title VII: Legislative H-istory, 7 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 431, 441-42 (1966)), aft'd, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986).
5. Deborah Epstein, Can A 'Dumb Ass Woman Achieve Equality in the Workplace?
Running the Gauntlet of Hostile Environment Harassing Speech, 84 GEo LJ. 399, 409 n.62
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The above interpretation is so prevalent that it is almost
uniformly followed at the district, appellate, and supreme court
levels. Among legal commentators, the conclusion that Congress
amended sex discrimination to Title VII's list of prohibited
discriminatory bases as a joke is so widespread that it has
become "the standard interpretation of the statutes's history."
6
Such authors and commentators are wrong. The prevailing
conclusions misconstrue the complete story behind the battle to
add "sex" in Title VII. The following discussion will show that
Congress added sex as a result of subtle political pressure from
individuals, who for varying reasons, were serious about
protecting the rights of women. Part I reviews the prevailing
treatment of legislative history of sex discrimination. Part I will
show that judges and other legal scholars often give no credence
to the legislative history of sex discrimination. When the
legislative history of Title VII is examined, it is usually employed
to restrict expansion of sex discrimination protections. Part II
scrutinizes the history of sex discrimination, and reveals that the
sex discrimination provision was the result of complex political
struggles involving racial issues, presidential politics, and
competing factions of the women's rights movement. Part III
outlines debates in the House of Representatives concerning the
addition of sex to Title VII of the Act. This part will show that
feminists who strongly supported the inclusion of sex as a
protected class spoke out in favor of the provision and secured its
passage into law.
(1996); see also Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality under Law, 100
YALE L.J. 1281, 1283-84 (1991) ('[Slex discrimination in private employment was forbidden
under federal law only in a last minute joking "us boys" attempt to defeat Title VII's
prohibition on racial discrimination. Sex was added as a prohibited ground of
discrindnation when this attempted reductio ad absurdum failed and the law passed
anyway").
6. Vicki Schultz & Stephen Peterson, Race, Gender, Work, and Choice: An Empirical
Stucy of the Lack of Interest Defense in Title VII Cases Challenging Job Segregation, 59
U. CHI. L. REv. 1073, 1085 n.31 (1992).
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I. PREVAILING TREATMENT OF THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SEX
DISCRIMINATION BY THE JUDICIARY AND ACADEMIA
A. Dismissal of the Legislative History of Sex Discrimination
as a Mere Political Ploy
The practice of reducing the legislative history of sex
discrimination to a level of insignificance reaches back through
thirty years of scholarship. In part because organizations charged
with enforcing sex discrimination protections viewed these
protections with skepticism,7 commentators proclaimed the
legislative history as unimportant.8 Later publications dismissed
the debates in a similar manner. 9 The modern treatment of the
Title VII sex amendment is divided into two camps: treating
legislative history as a joke and denying its existence altogether.
7. The treatment of the "sex" provision in Title VII by the EEOC, the agency charged
with enforcing the scheme, was less than laudatory of the amendment during the years
soon after its inception. The subject of sex discrimination invoked little more than
boredom or hostility from the Commission. CYNTHIA ELLEN HARRISON, PRELUDE TO
FEMINISM: WoMEN'S ORGANIZATIONS, THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, AND THE RISE OF THE
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 1942 TO 1968 497 (1982) (Ph.D. dissertation, Columbia University).
EEOC Executive Director M. Thompson Powers made clear that "the commission is very
much aware of the importance of not becoming the 'sex commission.'" Id. His successor,
Herman Edelsberg, also informed the press that "no man should be required to have a
male secretary." Id.; CAROLINE BIRD, BORN FEMALE: THE HIGH COST OF KEEPING WOMEN
DOwN 14 (1970). Journalists of the time also entered the fray. The New Republic, the
Wall Street Journal, and the New York Times all berated the new provision. Robert
Stevens Miller, Jr., Sex Discrimination and Mtle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 51
MINN. L REV. 877, 884 (1967) (asking, "Why should a mischievous joke perpetrated on the
floor of the House of Representatives be treated by a responsible administrative body [the
EEOC] with this kind of seriousness?"); HARRISON, supra, at 499-500; BIRD, supra, at 15-16.
These comments are typical of the attitude towards the amendment soon after its
inception, and most likely constitute the origins of the sex discrimination myth that lives
on in the present.
8. See, e.g., Leo Kanowitz, Sex-Based Discrimination in American Law III. 7Ytle VII
of the 1964 Civil Rights Act and the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 20 HASTINGS LJ. 305, 311
(1968) ('In the context of that debate and of the prevailing Congressional sentiment when
the amendment was offered, it is abundantly clear that a principal motive in introducing
it was to prevent passage of the basic legislation being considered by Congress, rather than
solicitude for women's employment rights.") (footnotes omitted); Richard K. Berg, Equal
Employment Opportunity Under the Civil Rights Act, 31 BROOK. L. REv. 62, 79 (1964)
(labelling the sex amendment a mere "orphan"); See also Note, Classification on the Basis
of Sex and the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IOWA L. REv. 778, 791 (1965) (hereinafter
Classification on the Basis of Sex].
9. E.g., ARTHUR B. SMITH, JR., EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 327 (1978); Note, Developments in the Law: Employment Discrimination and
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109, 1167 (1971).
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Commentators espouse the "joke" theory for a variety of
reasons. The most common reason is that the tale provides an
interesting sidenote for discussion of larger Title VII issues.'0
Other commentators use the myth to highlight the fragility of
women's rights and weave the event into an overall struggle for
equality."
Still others conclude that little or no useful legislative history
exists at all. 12 These commentators frequently use the supposed
nonexistence of legislative history as an interesting aside, often
relegating it to a footnote.' 3 Commentators also employ this pre-
sumption as an analytical stepping stone to address the broad
remedial goals of Title VII 14 that emerge in later Congressional
debates and jurisprudence. 15 The Supreme Court ascribes to this
theory and concludes that the limited legislative history provides
little guidance for interpreting Title VII. In Meritor Savings
Bank v. Vinson,16 an important sexual harassment decision, the
Court noted:
The prohibition against discrimination based on sex was
added to Title VII at the last minute on the floor of the
10. E.g., Suzanne Sangree, Title VII Prohibitions Against Hostile Environment Sexual
Harassment and the First Amendment: No Collision In Sight 47 RuTGERS L. REV. 461, 481
(1995); Ruth C. Vance, Workers Compensation and Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
A Remedy for Employees, or a Shield for Employers? 11 HOFST LAB. LJ. 141, 147 (1993);
Sandra J. Libeson, Comment, Reviving the Comparable Worth Debate in the United States:
A Look Toward the European Community, 16 CoMP. LAB. L. 358, 367 (1995); Sally A.
Piefer, Comment, Sexual Harassment From the Victim's Perspective: The Need for the
Seventh Circuit to Adopt the Reasonable Woman Standard, 77 MARQ. L. REV. 85, 88-89
(1993).
11. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN L. REV. 813, 816-17 (1991); MacKinnon,
supra note 5, at 1283-84.
12. E.g., Carrie N. Baker, Comment, Proposed Title IX Guidelines on Sex-Based
Harassment of Students, 43 EMORY LJ. 271, 286 (1994); Michael J. Levy, Note, Sex,
Promotions, and Title, VII: Why Sexual Favoritism is Not Sexual Discrimination, 45
HASTINGS L J. 667, 668 n.4 (1994); Tracy L. Bach, Note, Gender Stereotyping in
Employment Discrimination Finding a Balance of Evidence and Causation Under Title VII,
77 MiNN. L. REV. 1251, 1281 (1993); Thomas D. Brown, Recent Development, When
Counseling is Not Enough: The Ninth Circuit Requires Employers to Discipline Sexual
Harassers-Intekofer v. Turnage, 973 F.2d 733 (9th Cir. 1992), 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 901, 919
n.3 (1993) (noting that "[tihere is no legislative history to guide courts in determining what
is 'sex' discrimination").
13. E.g., Epstein, supra note 5, at 409 n.62.
14. See infra note 24.
15. See, e.g., Lisa Wehren, Note, Same Gender Sexual Harassment Under Title VII:
Garcia'v. Elf Atochem Makes a Step in the Wrong Dizrection, 32 CAL. W. L. REv. 87, 91-92
(1995) (concluding that 1964 legislative history provides 'little guidance" before one
examines later congressional and judicial
activity).
16. 477 U.S. 57 (1986).
1997] LEGISLATWE HISTORY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION 141
House of Representatives. The principal argument in opposi-
tion to the amendment was that "sex discrimination" was
sufficiently different from other types of discrimination that
it ought to receive separate legislative treatment. This argu-
ment was defeated, the bill quickly passed as amended, and
we are left with little legislative history to guide us in inter-
preting the Act's prohibition against discrimination based on
"sex".17
Lower courts have followed suit, reciting the conventional wisdom
as seen in the above quote, with some frequency.18
These interpretations are relatively benign omissions, used as
footnotes or preliminary discussion before addressing wider Title
VII or feminist concepts. Other commentators, however, highlight
the limited legislative history to restrict expansion of sexual
protections in employment. These discussions transcend innocu-
17. Id. at 63-64 (citations omitted); see also General Electric Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S.
125, 143 (1976) (The legislative history of Title VII's prohibition of sex discrimination is
notable primarily for its brevity"). The Court also stated.
Title VII was originally intended to protect the rights of Negroes. On the
final day of consideration by the entire House, Representative Smith added
an amendment to prohibit sex discrimination. It has been speculated that the
amendment was added as an attempt to thwart passage of Title VII. The
amendment was passed by the House that same day, and the entire bill was
approved two days later and sent to the Senate[.]
County of Washington v. Gunther, 452 U.S. 161, 190 n.4 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
18. See, e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 875 (9th Cir. 1991); International Union
v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (Posner, J.,
dissenting), rev'd, 499 U.S. 187 (1991); American Fed'n of State County and Mun.
Employees v. Washington, 770 F.2d 1401, 1404 (9th Cir. 1985); International Union v.
Westinghouse Elec. Co., 631 F.2d 1094, 1101 (3d Cir. 1980); Dodge v. Giant Food, Inc., 488
F.2d 1333, 1336 n.17 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Swage v. Inn Philadelphia, No. 1996 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 8795, at *6 (E.D. Pa. June 21, 1996); Tamer v. Prima Donna Resorts, Inc., 919 F.
Supp. 351, 354 (D. Nev. 1996); King v. M.R. Brown, Inc., 911 F. Supp. 161, 168 n.4 (E.D.
Pa. 1995); Sale v. Waverly-Shell Rock Bd. of Educ., 390 F. Supp. 784, 787 (N.D. Iowa
1975); Bradford v. Peoples Natural Gas Co., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 432 (W.D. Pa. 1972). But see
Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (concluding that
'(w]hat little legislative history that exists in the area of sex discrimination has convinced
the courts that 'Congress had intended to strike out at the entire spectrum of disparate
treatment of men and women resulting from sex stereotypes') (citing Sprogis v. United Air
Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971)); Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385
(5th Cir. 1971) stating:
The amendment ... was adopted one day before House passage of the Civil
Rights Act. It was added on the floor and engendered little relevant debate.
In attempting to read Congress' intent in these circumstances, however, it is
reasonable to assume, from a reading of the statute itself, that one of
Congress' main goals was to provide equal access to the job market for both
men and women.
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ous anecdotal analysis and affirmatively misapply the available
legislative material.
B. Affirmative Misuse: A Tool to Restrict the Expansion of
Sexual Protections
Commentators have also applied the legislative history to
reach a certain conclusion. Most of these discussions, however,
not only inaccurately recount the congressional debate, but also
misinterpret the intentions of Congress to reach a prescribed end.
Commentators conclude that because the legislative history of sex
discrimination is allegedly so brief and unhelpful, Title VII only
provides protection for the most traditional of sexually
discriminating activity. As a result, courts deny sex
discrimination protections to individuals whose circumstances
challenge the frontiers of sex discrimination law.19
Some commentators have considered whether sex discrimina-
tion deserves less congressional attention than race because of the
sex amendment's dubious origin.2" Discussions about sex discri-
mination ultimately conclude that gender has been a less
invidious category of discrimination than race.21 This debate also
surfaces in a historical perspective, arguably revealing cultural
attitudes towards sex discrimination in America at a given time.22
The most harmful, and most common, misuse of the
legislative history is found in judicial efforts to restrict coverage
of the ban on sex discrimination.23 Judges have applied such
19. This Article does not address what substantive limits should be placed on the
protections of sex discrimination. Rather, I offer that the basis upon which many
restrictive interpretations rest, the alleged ambiguous legislative history of Congress, is an
improper one.
20. Schultz & Peterson, supra note 6, at 1181 (concluding that such inference is
possible); cf. Michael D. Moberly, Reconsidering the Discriminatory Motive Requirement
in ADEA Disparate Treatment Cases, 24 N.M. L. REv. 89, 103-04 (1994) (arguing that age
discrimination cannot be less "pernicious" than sex discrimination because sex was included
as a mere "last-minute legislative ploy" to Title VII).
21. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDs: THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION LAws 278-279 (1992) (examining legislative history in part and concluding,
"[wihatever the source and extent of sexual inequality in this country, women were never
slaves, and they have never been subjected to invidious discrimination in public
accommodations").
22. Beverly H. Earle & Gerald A. Madek, An International Perspective on Sexual
Harassment Law, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 43, 48 (1993) ("The reason, for the absence of
legislative history [of sex discrimination in Title VII] provides a telling insight into the
attitudes of many Americans toward gender discrimination").
23. It is not the sole ground on which protections are denied, but rather a significant
argument, coupled with other assertions, that spells the demise of a particular protection
on the basis of sex. See, e.g., Kelly Ann Cahill, Hooters: Should There be an Assumption
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restrictions in spite of later congressional and judicial conduct
affirming the broad remedial goals of Title VII.24 Judges have
used legislative history to restrain uniformly-accepted doctrine
and to restrict expansions of sex discrimination law beyond
established frontiers.
The development of sexual harassment jurisprudence, a
doctrine' now well-embedded in American law, was in part
rejected because of misapplication of the 1964 congressional
debates. In Come v. Bausch & Lomb,2 two female plaintiffs
claimed that the relentless sexual advances of their supervisors
forced them to resign from their positions.26  The court's
examination of the legislative history of sex discrimination was a
significant factor in rejecting plaintiffs sexual harassment claims.
Judge Frey noted that sex discrimination was a last minute
addition to Title VII and contained no intent to include sexual
harassment. 27 The court concluded that nothing in the Civil
Rights Act could reasonably reach sexual advances "where such
complained of acts or conduct had no relationship to the nature
of the employment."28 Thus, Judge Frey, in part on a
misexamination of the legislative history, held that it was
"ludicrous" to assume that Title VII protected individuals from
sexual harassment.29
Modem, unsettled doctrines have suffered as well from this
type of analysis. For example, misreadings of the legislative
history have thwarted attempts to expand sex discrimination to
of the Risk Defense to Some Hostile Work Environment Sexual Harassment Claims?, 48
VAND. L. REv. 1107, 1142 (1995) (noting the alleged lack of legislative history of sex
discrimination as one argument of many concluding that an assumption of risk defense to
sexual harassment claims does not violate the goals of Title VII).
24. Congress affirmed its opposition to sex discrimination in 1972. 'Discrimination
against women is no less serious than other forms of prohibited employment practices and
is to be accorded the same degree of social concern given to any type of unlawful
discrimination.' H.R REP. No. 238, at 2 (1972), reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2141.
The Supreme Court has articulated similar goals. See, e.g., Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co.,
424 U.S. 747, 763 (1976) (stating that Title VII prohibits "all practices in whatever form
which create inequality in employment opportunity due to discrimination on the basis of
race, religion, sex, or national origin").
25. 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975), vacated, 562 F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977).
26. Id. at 161.
27. Id. at 163.
28. Id.
29. Id.; see also Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 557
(D.NJ. 1976), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); c. Miller v. Bank of America, 418 F.
Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (arguing that while '[i]t is conceivable, under plaintiffs
theory, that flirtations of the smallest order would give rise to liability .... [I]t would
seem wise for the Courts to refrain from delving into these matters"), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211
(9th Cir. 1979).
19971 143
144 WILLIAM & MARY JOURNAL OF WOMEN AND THE LAW [Vol. 3:137
protect transsexuals and to prohibit same-sex sexual harassment.
In Ulane v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,3° plaintiff Karen Ulane alleged
that her discharge violated Title VII on the grounds that she was
discriminated against as a transsexual.3 1 After noting that a
statute should be interpreted according to its "common
meaning, 32 the court reasoned, "The total lack of legislative
history supporting the sex amendment coupled with the
circumstances of the amendment's adoption clearly indicates that
Congress never considered nor intended that this 1964 legislation
apply to anything other than the traditional concept of sex."33
Judge Wood, writing for a unanimous appellate bench, then
applied the common meaning concept to transsexuals and
homosexuals, stating that, "Had Congress intended more, surely
the legislative history would have at least mentioned its intended
broad coverage of homosexuals, transvestites, or transsexuals, and
would no doubt have sparked an interesting debate. There is not
the slightest suggestion in the legislative record to support an all-
encompassing interpretation."3 The court in Ulane concluded
that such coverage would exceed even the intended broad
remedial scope of Title VII15 and rejected the plaintiffs claim.36
Courts have examined same-sex sexual harassment claims on
similar grounds.3 For example, in Hopkins v. Baltimore Gas &
30. 742 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1984).
31. Id. at 1082.
32. Id. at 1085. The "plain meaning" rule states that "where the language of an
enactment is clear and construction according to its terms does not lead to absurd or
impractical consequences, the words employed are to be taken as the final expression of
the meaning intended." United States v. Missouri Pac. RPR. Co., 278 U.S. 269, 278 (1929);
see also Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979).
33. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085; d. International Union v. Johnson Controls Inc., 886 F.2d
871, 902 (7th Cir. 1989) (Posner, J., dissenting) (There is no useful legislative history
concerning the [bona fide occupational qualification] defense, and-no doubt because the
prohibition of sex discrimination was added to Title VII at the last minute--no reference
at all to the application of the defense to sex discrimination. A narrow reading is,
nevertheless, inevitable) (emphasis added), rev'd 499 U.S. 187 (1991).
34. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1085. But see infra note 82 and accompanying text.
35. Ulane, 742 F.2d at 1086 ("Although the maxim that remedial statutes should be
liberally construed is well recognized, that concept has reasonable bounds beyond which
a court cannot go without transgressing the prerogatives of Congress").
36. Id. The court also rejected plaintiff's claims on the ground that repeated attempts
to introduce legislation prohibiting discrimination against homosexuals have failed. See,
e.g., Civil Rights Act Amendments of 1981: Hearings on H.R. 1454 Before the Subcomm.
on Employment Opportunities of the House Comm. on Educ. and Labor, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1-2 (1982) (statements of Rep. Hawkins, chairman of subcommittee, and Rep. Weiss,
author of the bill).
37. But see Griffith v. Keystone Steel & Wire, 887 F. Supp. 1133, 1137 n.3 (C.D. Ill.
1995) (noting the dearth of legislative history, yet affirming same sex sexual harassment
as a viable cause of action).
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Electric Co.,-" the court scrutinized the legislative history and
concluded:
In the context of Title VII's legislative history, however, it is
apparent that Congress did not intend such sweeping
regulation. The suggestion that Title VII was intended to
regulate everything sexual in the workplace would
undoubtedly have shocked every member of the 88th
Congress, even those most vigorously supporting the passage
of the [Civil Rights] Act. Detached from their historical
setting, the terms of Title VII's prohibition of discrimination,
"because of' an individual's "sex," stand only as "inert
language, lifeless words," and, perhaps, even "playthings with
which to reconstruct the Act."39
Although the Hopkins court ultimately affirmed plaintiffs
claim, it interpreted the legislative history of Title VII as a
significant restricting force. In Goluszek v. H.P. Smith,4° Judge
Ann Williams rejected a same-sex sexual harassment claim on the
grounds that such activity "was not the type of conduct Congress
intended to sanction when it enacted Title VII."41 Judge Williams
further concluded from the legislative history that Congress was
concerned only with prohibiting discrimination against a discrete
and vulnerable group such as women.42
The misinterpretation of the legislative history of sex
discrimination is pervasive. Commentators have repeatedly
rejected the debate as anecdotal, vague, or nonexistent. Those
commentators that do examine the legislative history, usually
members of the judiciary, conclude that Congress enacted the
amendment as a last-minute political ploy. As a result, judges
have used the legislative history of Title VII to restrict the
concept of sex discrimination to its most traditional notions.
These traditional interpretations of the legislative history directly
contradict the conclusion supported by what actually occurred
during the congressional debates concerning the sex amendment
to Title VII and what occurred behind the scenes in Congress.
Ample evidence supports the conclusion that Congress enacted the
sex discrimination ban to advance the cause of women's rights.
38. 77 F.3d 745 (4th, Cir. 1996).
39. Id. at 749 (quoting Romero v. Int'l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379
(1959)).
40. 697 F. Supp. 1452 (N.D. M11. 1988).
41. Id. at 1456.
42. Id.
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II. THE HISTORY OF THE SEx DISCRIMINATION AMENDMENT
A. Pre-History: Setting the Stage for Political Action
The movement for protection from discrimination on the basis
of sex finds its roots almost one-hundred years before enactment
of the Act. Even as society took great strides in favor of racial
equality, women, whose plight of discrimination commentators see
as being intertwined with blacks,43 were less successful in
obtaining effective protections. The Supreme Court, during this
period, repeatedly rejected extending protections to women based
on the Constitution. The Fourteenth Amendment did not confer
the right to vote." Instead, the whims of state judiciaries
determined women's voting rights.45 Courts also denied women
the right to practice law.4
Later courts began to acknowledge disparity of gender
treatment, but still utilized traditional sex roles to aid their
decisions. In Muller v. Oregon,47 the Court upheld an Oregon
statute providing a ten hour maximum workday for women in
order to equalize their bargaining position with men.48 The Court
also concluded that this law was necessary to preserve women's
maternal functions and "the well-being of the race."49
43. See, e.g., GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMA 1075 (1962); Blanche Crozier,
Constitutionality ofDiscimination Based on Sex, 15 B.U. L REV. 723, 727-28 (1935). See
also ASHLEY MONTAGU, MAN's MosT DANGEROUS MYTH: THE FALLACY OF RACE 181 (1964)
(describing the similarity between racial bigotry and sexual prejudice). But see Angela P.
Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 581, 601-03
(1990) (examining the unique discriminatory issues of black women).
44. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1874) (stating that the privileges and
immunities clause applied to women but that the clause did not grant the right to vote).
In fact, few places in the world permitted women to vote during this period. Only
Australia, Sweden, New Zealand, and the frontier territories of Wyoming, Colorado, Utah,
Idaho granted the right. See BiRD, supra note 7, at 21.
45. CY. Bickett v. Knight, 85 S.E. 418 (N.C. 1915) (women not qualified to vote), and
In re Carragher, 128 N.W. 352 (Iowa 1910) (same), and Gouger v. Timberlake, 46 N.E. 339
(Ind. 1897) (same), with Nzv. CONST. art. II, § 1 (constitutional right to vote), and Scown
v. Czarnecki, 106 N.E. 276 (111. 1914) (statute granting women's suffrage upheld).
46. In re Lockwood, 154 U.S. 116 (1894); Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130
(1872).
47. 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
48. Id. at 412.
49. Id. at 422.
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The absence of effective protection for women helped spark
the suffrage movement.5 After much struggle, the women's
suffrage movement scored a major victory with the ratification of
the Nineteenth Amendment, which affirmed women's right to
vote.5 ' Although the Nineteenth Amendment represented the
culmination of the suffrage movement,52 in practice it achieved
very little beyond the right to vote. 53 The piecemeal protections
granted by the Constitution, combined with the stereotypical
attitudes that members of the judiciary held, left women with
enormous ground to cover in order to achieve effective protection
from discrimination on the basis of sex. Out of these limited
successes arose the organization that would become a major
player in adding the sex amendment to Title VII: The National
Woman's Party(NWP).
B. 1920-1960: The Political Forces Take Shape
Out of the remains of the suffrage movement, women's groups
furthered the cause of equality. At the forefront of the equality
movement was the NWP. Originally founded during the suffrage
movement in 1916, the NWP supported ratification of the
Nineteenth Amendment.14 After suffrage, the NWP focused on
one primary goal: passage of the Equal Rights Amendment
(ERA).55
The NWP was not a "typical" women's organization. Most
NWP members came from middle or upper class backgrounds.
56
Almost no women from the working class joined and the party
admitted no male members. 57 Unlike other feminist movements,
which drew their strength from large membership, legacies and
50. See generally ELEANOR FLEXNER, CENTURY OF STRuGLE (1959) (providing
comprehensive history of suffrage movement); AILEEN S. KRADITOR, THE IDEAS OF THE
WOMAN SUFFRAGE MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1965).
51. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX.
52. Classification on the Basis of Sex, supra note 8, at 778.
53. State v. Mittle, 113 S.E. 335, 337 (S.C. 1922) (stating that the Nineteenth
Amendment only prohibited sex discrimination in legislation prescribing the qualifications
of suffrage" and did not confer upon women the right to vote).
54. Jo Freeman, How "Sex- Got Into ile VII: Persistent Opportunism as a Maker of
Public Policy, 9 LAW & INEQ. J. 163, 165 (1991).
55. Id.
56. Carl M. Brauer, Women Activists, Southern Conservatives, and the Prohibition of
Sex Discrimination in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 49 J. S. HIST. 37, 39 (1983).
57. Id.
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wealthy benefactors funded the NWP.58 As a result, the NWP did
not sympathize with the working class, or non-white women.59
Other feminist groups who feared the ERA's blanket effects
opposed the amendment. Labor groups fought passage of the
ERA because they feared it would abolish protective legislation
for working women.60 Anti-ERA organizations blocked the NWPs
persistent lobbying for twenty years.6' During the 1940's,
however, "subtle change[s] in the public attitude toward [the
ERA]" 62 and favorable statements in Congress raised hopes for its
passage. 6 Support for the ERA peaked in 1950 when it passed
through the Senate. 64 Stiff opposition in the House, however,
halted the bill.65 Over time, support for the Bill eventually
waned. Serious interest remained only in the few women's
organizations who had supported the ERA for decades. 66 The
NWP introduced the ERA in Congress, but lacked the influence
to get it passed.67 The Kennedy administration presented a fresh
opportunity to salvage the ERA. President Kennedy, who
endorsed the ERA during his campaign, created the President's
Commission on the Status of Women (PCSW) to address the
divisive ERA question.68 The aged NWP leadership lobbied the
newly created Commission, hoping the Commission would support
the amendment. Instead, the PCSW forged a compromise,
concluding that "a constitutional amendment need not now be
sought in order to establish this principle [of equality]." 6 9
The Commission's rejection of the ERA angered and
frustrated the NWP.70 The adverse decision amounted to "the
58. Freeman, supra note 54, at 165. See also SUSAN D. BECKER, THE ORIGINS OF THE
EQUAL RIGHTS AMENDMENT: AMERICAN FEMINISM BETWEEN THE WARS 38-42 (1981). The
NWP's primary benefactor provided a historic Capitol Hill mansion for a national
headquarters. Freeman, supra note 54, at 165 n.15. When the mansion was condemned
to make way for a new supreme court building, the benefactor purchased another equally
lavish house. Id.
59. See infra note 73.
60. Freeman, supra note 54, at 165.
61. Id. at 165-66.
62. 25 CONG. DIG. 290 (1946).
63. In 1940 the Republican party endorsed the ERA in its party platform. The
Democrats followed four years later. Freeman, supra note 54, at 166.
64. Id. at 167.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 167-68.
67. Id. at 168.
68. Brauer, supra note 56, at 40.
69. PATRICIA G. ZELMAN, WOMEN, WORK, AND NATIONAL POLICY: THE KENNEDY-JOHNSON
YEARS 34 (1982).
70. Brauer, supra note 56, at 41.
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most prestigious national panel ever to report on the status of
women" rejecting the NWPs primary objective of the previous
forty years.71 The NWP was in a bind. The aged party found
their proposal rejected by a prestigious federal commission on
women and attacked by other feminist groups who believed that
the ERA would strip hard fought protections away from female
labor. The NWP needed a fresh opportunity with which to
revitalize their battered Amendment. The growing civil rights
movement, with a connection between the rights of women and
the rights of blacks,72 provided such an opportunity.
C. The National Woman's Party Takes Action: The Forces
Behind the Sex Discrimination Amendment
Although the NWP was not particularly concerned with the
rights of minorities, 78 it viewed the Civil Rights movement as an
opportunity to advance their goals under the political cover of
well-supported legislation.74 As a result, the NWP created the
idea of adding sex as a protected class to the pending Civil Rights
Bill.
Making use of their extensive political connections, the NWP
approached Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia, a
conservative southern Democrat and a strong opponent of Civil
Rights.7 5 Smith, the powerful Chairman of the House Rules
Committee76 and a long-standing member of Congress, 77 possessed
close ties to the NWP. 7s The NWP was certainly aware of Smith's
opposition to the Civil Rights Bill. Accordingly, the NWP framed
its request for the amendment in terms that would benefit his
agenda. On December 10, 1963, the NWP wrote to Smith, stating
that, "[tihis single word 'sex' would divert some of the high
71. Id.
72. Id. at 39. See supra note 43.
73. Brauer, supra note 56, at 42 (citing personal interviews with NWP members). The
NWP once issued a resolution lamenting the lack of "protection against discrimination
because of 'race, color, religion or national origin," to a White Woman, a Woman of the
Christian Religion, or a Woman of United States Origin." HARRISON, supra note 7, at 472;
See also Letter from Emma Guffey Miller, President, National Woman's Party, to
Congressman Howard W. Smith (Jan. 6, 1963) (on file with author) (attaching copy of
resolution).
74. Brauer, supra note 56, at 42.
75. BIRD, supra note 7, at 1 ("[Congressman Smith] was a Virginia gentleman who had
been defending the Southern Way of Life in Congress for nearly a third of a century").
76. Kanowitz, supra note 8, at 310.
77. BIRD, supra note 7, at 1.
78. Brauer, supra note 56, at 42.
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pressure, which is being used to force this Bill through without
proper attention to all the effects of it."79
Smith appeared hesitant at first, but he eventually warmed
to the idea of adding the 'sex' amendment.80 In a rare
appearance on "Meet the Press", a televised interview program,
Elizabeth May Craig, a well-known journalist, feminist, and
prominent member of the NWP, questioned Smith.81 After Ms.
Craig questioned him on the issue, Smith hinted that he might
offer an Amendment in the Civil Rights Bill prohibiting sex
discrimination in employment.8 2 NWP members wrote to Smith
and expressed their appreciation.8 3
III. THE CONGRESSIONAL DEBATE
A. Smith's Initial Offering: Sink the Entire Bill by Adding a
Controversial Measure
On February 8, 1964, merely two days before the bill moved
from the House to the Senate, Congressman Smith offered an
amendment to ban sex discrimination." The amendment shocked
the House as members realized its significance. 85 Smith's
79. Brauer, supra note 56, at 41-42 (citing letter from NWP member to Congressman
Smith).
80. Letter from Congressman Howard W. Smith to Emma Guffrey Miller, President,
National Woman's Party (Jan. 10, 1964) (on file with author).
81. BIRD, supra note 7, at 4; Brauer, supra note 56, at 44.
82. The actual conversation follows:
Elizabeth May Craig: Judge, it was brought out before your Committee that
the bill does not provide that women shall have equal rights. Would you try
to get them for us in the bill?
Congressman Smith: Would you like me to?
Craig: Yes, sir.
Smith: Well, maybe I would. I am always strong for women, you know.
Craig: An amendment on the floor?
Smith: I might do that.
Brauer, supra note 56, at 44.
83. Id.
84. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
85. CHARLES & BARBARA WHALEN, THE LONGEST DEBATE: A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE
CIVIL RIGHTS AcT 115 (1985). Such an amendment would seem especially unexpected to
House members because of Smith's long opposition to the Civil Rights Bill. Id. at 116. At
this point it is possible that Smith's devious intention was not yet evident to many
members at large. Others may have expressed shock because they did realize his motive
to sink the entire bill. BIRD, supra note 7, at 1 ('[Congressman Smith] proposed an
amendment that sounded like a joke even while the clerk was reading it aloud").
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proposed amendment would expand coverage from seven million
blacks to include twenty-one million women of all colors.s6 The
amendment would provide all women job rights that were equal
to men for the first time in history8 7
Smith waited until the ruckus died down, then commented:
Mr. Chairman this amendment is offered to ... include
within our desire to prevent discrimination against another
minority group, the women, but a very essential minority
group, in the absence of which the majority group would not
be here today.
Now, I am very serious about this amendment. It has been
offered several times before, but it was offered at
inappropriate places in the bill. Now, this is the appropriate
place for this amendment to come in. I do not think it can
do any harm to this legislation; maybe it can do some good.
I think it will do some good for the minority sex.88
Smith did not appear serious. Prior to offering the
amendment, he consistently fought the Civil Rights Bill and other
related matters that increased government intervention or offered
protection to minority groups.89 Smith was well known as a
master of using procedural devices to thwart unfavorable bills.9°
Further, he hinted that he might use similar tactics here. Smith
warned Congressman Emmanuel Celler, a civil rights supporter,
that the Civil Rights Bill "was as full of booby traps as a dog is
full of fleas."91 Given his consistent past behavior, Smith's move
was apparently not intended to protect women from discrimina-
86. BIRD, supra note 7, at 3.
87. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 85, at 115-116.
88. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
89. See generally BRUCE JONATHAN DIERENFIELD, CONGRESSMAN HOwARD W. SMITH: A
PoLIcAL BIoGRAPHY (1981) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia) (stating that
"[wihen the mood of the country, in the late fifties, began to favor expanded federal aid
programs and civil rights legislation, Smith, a reactionary member ... used all of the
parliamentary wizardry at his command to prevent their enactment into law.").
90. For example, in the 1940's, Smith used his "parliamentary wizardry" to fight the
establishment of the Fair Employment Practices Commission, which forbade employment
discrimination on the basis of race, ancestry, religion, and color in firms with over fifty
employees. DIERENFIELD, supra note 89, at 191. His legislative maneuvering on the issue
led one Congressman to characterize Smith's efforts as "a travesty on parliamentary law
and procedure." Id. at 192. Smith's delaying kept the bill off the floor for five hours. Id.
When the House finally adjourned at 3:19 a.m., the original measure was so watered-down
that it lacked any influence. Id. The Senate refused to act on the measure and the bill
ultimately died. Id.
91. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 85, at 116.
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tion. Rather, it was a last ditch effort to sink the Civil Rights
Bill . 2
As if Smith's consistent record did not color his motives
enough, his later conduct further confirms his dubious intentions.
Smith read from a letter that he allegedly93 received from a lady
who had heard about his amendment. 4 She complained that
Smith should remedy the numerical imbalance between the sexes:
females outnumbered males by 2,661,000 according to the 1960
Census Poll.95 She urged that "this is a grave injustice to
womankind."9
The satire increased as Smith read on:
Just why the Creator would set up such an imbalance of
spinsters, shutting off the urightn of every female to have a
husband of her own, is, of course, known only to nature ...
Would you have any suggestions as to what course our
Government might pursue to protect our spinster friends in
their "right" to a nice husband and family?97
Audience members burst into laughter.98 The pandemonium
was so loud that Smith had to stop many times to settle every-
one.99 Smith then wrapped up his opening soliloquy by saying:
I read that letter just to illustrate that women have some
real grievances and some real rights to be protected. I am
serious about this thing. I just hope that the committee will
accept it. Now, what harm can you do this bill that was so
perfect yesterday and is so imperfect today-what harm will
this do to the condition of the bill?100
92. But see Michael Evan Gold, A Tale of Two Amendments: The Reasons Congress
Added Sex to Title VII and Their Implication for the Issue of Comparable Worth, 19 DUQ.
L. REv. 453, 454 (1981) (concluding that Congressman Smith added sex to Title VII for
serious reasons).
93. John J. Donohue III, Prohibiting Sex Discrimination in the Workplace: An Economic
Perspective, 56 U. CHI. L. REv. 1337, 1337-38 (1989).
94. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964); Letter from Leila G. Whitney, to Congressman Howard
W. Smith (Jan. 26, 1964) (copy on file with author).
95. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964)
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. BIRD, supra note 7, at 5. Representative Martha Griffiths later commented on the
raucous behavior. "I presume that if there had been any necessity' to have pointed out
that women were a second-class sex, the laughter would have proved it." 110 CoNG. REc.
2578 (1964).
99. BIRD, supra note 7, at 5.
100. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
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Smith's opening salvo is consistent with prevailing doctrinal
wisdom: he offered the amendment to sink the entire Civil Rights
Bill by increasing its controversy. 10 1 However, the Congressional
debate did not end at this point. Further discussion shows that
more forces were at work in the debate than a failed effort to
scuttle the bill.
B. Congressional Liberal Response: Fight the Amendment to
Save the Bill
Someone had to act. Congressman Smith's speech sparked
chaos in the House. Smith was a master at manipulating
procedural rules to stop unfavorable legislation.1 2  His sex
amendment could have easily triggered another triumphant
victory for civil rights foes.
The responsibility of stopping Smith rested on Emmanuel
Celler, a liberal Congressman from New York and floor manager
of the debate °3 Celler was the Democratic leader of a bipartisan
coalition to pass the bill,"04 and also a staunch opponent of the
equal rights legislation.1°5 When Celler rose in opposition to the
amendment,1 6 Smith responded "Oh, no," in an expression of
mock horror. °7 Celler attempted to turn the tide against the
amendment.
The noise in the House was still so loud when Celler began
speaking that he approached the subject lightly to appease the
crowd. l08 Celler quipped that although he usually has the last
words in his household, they are usually, "Yes, dear."1"
Celler then addressed the substance of his argument. He
noted that Assistant Secretary of Labor Esther Peterson, also in
charge of the Women's Bureau,110 opposed the addition of sex to
101. But see infra note 140 and accompanying text.
102. BIRD, supra note 7, at 5; see supra notes 89-90.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Emmanuel Celler persistently fought the Equal Rights Amendment. HARRISON,
supra note 7, at 97. As chair of House Judiciary Committee, he repeatedly refused to let
the measure reach the house floor. Id. His objections to the ERA or any other equality
based measure rested "on an unshakable belief that women required protection." Id.
106. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964).
107. Id.; WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 85, at 116.
108. BIRD, supra note 7, at 5.
109. 110 CONG. REC. 2577 (1964) (making a humurous attempt to say that in his
household women are not the minority).
110. Relations between Esther Peterson and the National Woman's Party, the primary
champion of the Equal Rights Amendment, were frequently strained at best. See HARRISON,
supra note 7, at 359.
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the Civil Rights Bill."1 Peterson's position was supported by the
PCSW's conclusion that sex discrimination "involves problems
sufficiently different from discrimination based on other factors
listed to make separate treatment preferable. " 112  In using this
argument himself, Celler, typical of his diplomatic nature, 113 did
not reject sex discrimination on substantive grounds.
Celler also asserted that serious repercussions would result
from the adoption of the sex amendment. Celler argued that the
amendment would nullify many state laws that protect women
from detrimental conditions such as military service and
alimony.114  Celler also stated that the plight of women was
insufficiently analogous to the plight of blacks because women
have managed "real and genuine progress" such as the Equal Pay
Act of 1963 and the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.115
Responding to an exchange between Smith and himself, Celler
concluded as follows:
I think the amendment seems illogical, ill timed, ill placed,
and improper .... I say, wait, indeed, until more returns
are in before we attempt to do anything like this on this bill.
In any event, it should not be done piecemeal, it should be
done generally and universally. 116
Celler's statements implicitly represent two political forces
that sought to influence the addition of sex to the Civil Rights
Bill. First, he represented liberals whose primary concern was
111. 110 CONG. REc. 2577 (1964).
112. Id.
113. HARRISON, supra note 7, at 97 ("Celler tended to couch his convictions in unctuously
courtly language').
114. Id. Celler stated:
Imagine the upheaval that would result from adoption of blanket language
requiring total equality. Would male citizens be justified in insisting that
women share with them the burdens of compulsory military service? What
would become of traditional family relationships? What about alimony? Who
would have the obligation of supporting whom? Would fathers rank equally
with mothers in the right of custody to children? What would become of the
crimes of rape and statutory rape? Would the Mann Act be invalidated?
Would the many State and local provisions regulating working conditions and
hours of employment for women be struck down?
You know the biological differences between the sexes. In many States we
have laws favorable to women. Are you going to strike those laws down?
This is the entering wedge, an amendment of this sort. The list of the
foreseeable consequences, I will say to the committee, is unlimited.
110 CONG. REC. 2577-78 (1964).
115. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964).
116. Id.
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the passage of racial, not sexual protections. Some members of
Congress feared that the additional sex protections would render
the bill unpalatable to wavering members of Congress. Further,
many women's groups that supported reform gave racial
discrimination a higher priority.117 Some of these women's groups
supported protections for women, but were willing to wait until
the more critical battle of race discrimination had been won.118
Finally, Celler did not wish to endanger protections already
favoring women."19
Celler and his allies did not explicitly oppose the sex
amendment on substantive grounds. Some members of Congress
favored sex protections, however, not until a later date when they
would not jeopardize racial protections. When the bill passed,
their desire for a later enactment became unnecessary.
C. Zealous Feminists Strike Back: Support the Ban on Sex
Discrimination Here and Now
Various female Congresswomen who spoke during the debate
represented a third group influencing the sex amendment. l2
They hoped to take Smith's ploy and turn it to their advantage.
These Congresswomen revitalized the debate and played a critical
role in securing the amendment's ultimate passage.
After the Smith-Celler exchange began to languish,' 21
Congresswoman Martha Griffiths entered the fray. She
revitalized the debate and strongly advocated the addition of the
Smith amendment. First, Griffiths argued that the pervasiveness
117. The President's Commission on the Status of Women, the Women's Bureau of the
Department of Labor, and the American Association of University Women all opposed the
amendment. Gold, supra note 92, at 459.
118. Representative Green, in opposition to the amendment, highlighted this point in
her debate:
I really and sincerely hope that this amendment will not be added to this bill.
It will clutter up the bill and it may later-very well-be used to help destroy
this section of the bill by some of the very people who today support it. And
I hope that no other amendment will be added to this bill on sex or age or
anything else, that would jeopardize our primary purpose in any way.
110 CONG. REc 2581 (1964).
119. See supra note 114.
120. A bipartisan coalition of five Congresswomen spoke out in favor of the Amendment:
Frances B. Bolton (R-OH), Martha W. Griffiths (D-Mich), Catharine May (R-WA), Edna F.
Kelley (D-NY), and Katharine St. George (R-NY). Because of the clarity and force of her
statements, I use Rep. Griffiths remarks as representative of the coalition.
121. People in the Congressional gallery, listening to the discussion between the 75-year-
old Celler and the 80-yr-old Smith about the biological differences between men and
women, could not help snickering. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 85, at 116-17.
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of sex discrimination mandated an appropriate remedy.1 Second,
Griffiths made the broad reach of the bill clear by posing the
following questions:
Mrs. GRIFFITHS: Mr. Chairman, is it your judgment that
this bill will protect colored men and colored women at the
hiring gate equally?
Mr. CELLER: This bill is all-embracing and will cover
everybody in the United States.
Mrs. GRIFFITHS: It will cover every colored man and every
colored woman?
Mr. CELLER: Yes, it will cover white men and white women
and all Americans.'2
Third, Representative Griffiths argued that omitting sex
discrimination from the bill would leave white women
unprotected:
I rise in support of the amendment primarily because I feel
as a white woman when this bill has passed... that white
women will be last at the hiring gate.' 24
Finally, Griffiths asserted that the bill at present would offer no
protection to black women.12
Griffiths and her allies revitalized the debate. The five
Congresswomen who spoke in favor of the amendment
represented a larger alliance committed to adding sex protections
to Title VII. These legislators, most notably Martha Griffiths,
sharpened the focus of the debate and highlighted the pressing
issues affecting women's struggle for equality.
D. Smith and His Allies Return: Don't Leave White Women
Behind
Smith and his supporters. largely kept silent as they watched
the split they caused amongst the normally unified liberal
122. 110 CONG. REC. 2578 (1964).
123. Id.
124. Id. Griffiths later repeated this contention in stronger language. "[A] vote against
this amendment today by a white man is a vote against his wife, or his widow, or his
daughter, or his sister." 110 CONG. REC. 2580 (1964).
125. 110 CONG. REC. 2579-80 (1964).
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opposition. Perhaps Smith hoped that Griffiths would be able to
peel away enough support from Celler, who wanted to close
Smith's trap. From Smith's perspective, letting traditional allies
of women's rights do his bidding may have seemed like a very
effective way to further his goals.
Smith's role in the debate, however, did not end with the
introduction of his controversial measure. During the debate, four
speakers in a row raised the argument initially stated by Griffiths
that white women would be left behind if other groups received
protection.1' Smith rose again and expressed a similar concern:
I put a question to you in behalf of the white women of the
United States. Let us assume that two women apply for the
same job and both of them are equally eligible, one a white
woman and one a Negro woman. The first thing that
employer will look at will be the provision with regard to the
records he must keep. If he does not employ that colored
woman and has to make that record, that employer will say,
"Well, now, if I hire the colored woman I will not be in any
trouble, but if I do not hire the colored woman and hire the
white woman, then the Commission is going to be looking
down my throat and will want to know why I did not. I may
be in a lawsuit."
That will happen as surely as we are here this afternoon.
You all know it.'27
Smith spoke in complete seriousness. Gone from his words
were the sarcastic and light-hearted tones of his opening remarks.
No one laughed when he spoke. The force of his argument
suggested that he was completely sincere about the plight that
would befall white women if the sex amendment was not added
to the bill.
Smith's supporters agreed. Four Smith allies expressed a
similar concern before he spoke. 12 Immediately after, two more
Smith allies associated themselves with his remarks and express-
ed support for the Amendment. The apparent conflict between
Smith's opening statements and later commentary can be recon-
ciled. First and foremost, it must be noted that Smith was an
opponent of civil rights legislation and introduced the sex discri-
mination provision to scuttle the bill. If the bill was to pass,
126. 110 CONG. REc. 2583 (1964) (remarks of Reps. Tuten, Pool, Andrews, and Rivers).
127. Id.
128. Id.
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however, Smith genuinely preferred a bill with a ban on sex
discrimination. If the bill had granted too many rights to other
interest groups, at least the bill would protect white women. 129
Remaining portions of the debate highlighted similar issues
that Griffiths, Celler, and Smith raised. The debate closed and
the amendment passed by a vote of 168 to 133.130
E. Onward to Victory: The Smith Amendment Beyond the
House Debate
After the debate, the sex amendment survived the House and
Senate unscathed even when the amendment was deliberately
brought to a vote to bring about its demise. Congressional
behavior towards the sex amendment, when viewed in its
entirety, clearly points to the conclusion that Congress passed the
sex amendment because of strong political forces seeking to
further the cause of equality for women. These political forces
include the conservative NWP that convinced Smith to issue the
measure, and the pro-ERA feminists who argued in the debate.
One need only look to the experience of Representative John
Dowdy (D-TX) to discover the fate of sex protection without the
support of feminist backers. Earlier in the debate Representative
Dowdy offered similar amendments which would have added
"sex" to Titles II, III, IV, and V of the bill.'3' The substance of
the amendments was no different than that of Smith's proposal.
Dowdy, like Smith, was a staunch opponent of civil rights.'32
Dowdy even knew of Smith's plans for his own amendment.' 33 If
the conventional wisdom is correct, then Dowdy's amendment
should have succeeded similarly to Smith's, providing some humor
for everyone.
Nothing could be further from the actual result. Although
Dowdy's actions mirrored Smith's in many ways, he lacked the
critical support of the NWP.13' As a result, his amendments were
129. Gold, supra note 92, at 466 (agreeing with this conclusion).
130. 110 CONG. REc. 2584 (1964).
131. Freeman, supra note 54, at 176.
132. Id.
133. Id. See also ZELMAN, supra note 69, at 63.
134. In an interview years after the debate, Alice Paul, the leader of the NWP, stated
that the NWP received no advance notice that Representative Dowdy would introduce sex
amendments, although they were pleased that he did. ALICE PAUL, CONVERSATIONS WITH
ALICE PAUL: WOMEN SUFFRAGE AND THE ERA (Amelia Fry, interviewer Nov. 1972, May
1973) in SUFFRAGISTS ORAL HISTORY PRoJEcT at 617-618, (Bancroft Library, University of
California (Berkeley) ed.).
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"howled down" and overwhelmingly defeated. 135
The sex amendment also overcame a congressional climate
that strongly disfavored amendments. Congressional leaders
supporting the bill fashioned a "three-prong whip system" that
kept legislators on hand to vote favorably on the bill.136 The
managers of the bill maintained as many as 133 representatives
who would vote down any amendment on request.137 Any attempt
to add a sex amendment would have had to overcome a nearly
overwhelming number of legislators willing to vote it down with
little notice. Thus, the sex discrimination amendment could not
have been added without strong multi-factional support.
Further, Smith and his supporters had ample opportunity to
remove the sex amendment from the bill before its ultimate
passage. The opportunity arose when the House voted on the
Smith amendment a second time. Just before the vote on the
final bill, Representative Williams of Mississippi called a second
vote on the Smith amendment. The bill passed again.' 8  If a
majority voting for the Smith amendment had added the
amendment as a joke and were ultimately against the bill, that
same majority would have defeated it outright when it came to
a full vote that same day.' 39
The most compelling evidence of feminist intervention came
from Congressman Smith himself. Smith, the very individual
who commentators rely on to deride the amendment, explicitly
acknowledged the critical help women provided in passing the
provision. Smith expressed this position in a letter to Robert
Stevens Miller, Jr., author of one of the early Articles examining
sex discrimination:
135. Id. at 629. The Dowdy Amendment to Title II was rejected 43 to 115. The
Amendment to Title III was rejected 26 to 112. 110 CONG. REc. 1978-79, 2280-81, 2264-65,
2297 (1964). Dowdy also attempted to add "age" as a protected class, but this Amendment
was also defeated 94 to 123 after some debate. 110 CoNG. REc. 2596-99 (1964).
136. WHALEN & WHALEN, supra note 85, at 121-22. The three-prong whip system,
"spotlighted individual congressmen, demanded their accountability, and prevented them
from falling into their old habits of evading amendment votes." Id.
137. Freeman, supra note 54, at 178.
138. 110 CONG. REC. 2804 (1964).
139. Gold, supra note 92, at 461 (NIt would be absurd to believe that the Representatives
who approved the Smith amendment . . . wanted to impair the very bill which they
promptly approved by an overwhelming margin"). However, this is not to say that Smith's
cadre had no influence at all. If Martha Griffiths or her allies offered such an amendment
on their own, it would have more than likely been defeated. Griffiths did intend to
sponsor a sex amendment of her own but refrained when she learned that Smith could
bring as many as 100 votes to support his own measure. Freeman, supra note 54, at 175.
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The statement that the amendment was "slipped in" the bill
by me in an attempt to delay voting, is utterly untrue, as the
record shows.
The amendment was a popular one. Particularly active in its
adoption were the women Members of the House. It was
debated fully and adopted in the House in open debate, and
subsequently approved in the senate.'4
The House ultimately approved the Civil Rights Bill by a vote of
290 to 130.141
In the Senate, the sex amendment, backed by strong feminist
support, met little challenge. Senator Everett Dirksen, leader of
the Republican minority in the Senate, offered some resistance by
raising the possibility that the drafters should delete the sex
amendment. 142 Dirksen, however, repeatedly failed to obtain a
majority on the issue and finally gave up, claiming he did so "in
order to avoid the wrath of the women."4 3 Although the House
version of the Civil Rights bill did not pass through the Senate
unscathed, the final measure endorsed by the Senate included the
sex discrimination provision.'" On July 2, 1964, President
Johnson signed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into law.
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As shown in the debate and afterward, feminist forces played
a crucial role in the passage of the sex amendment to Title VII.
Women lobbied congress for years, spoke forcefully in the House
debate and secured the amendment's final passage in the Senate.
Even Smith himself acknowledged the participation of women in
securing the passage of the amendment. The oratory in the
House, combined with congressional activity after the debate,
points to the conclusion that the addition of sex discrimination
provisions was a direct result of efforts of feminist groups to
advance the cause of women's rights.
140. Miller, supra note 7, at 883 n.34 (quoting a letter dated January 4, 1966, from
Congressman Howard W. Smith to the author). In the letter Smith also mentions his
seriousness in sponsoring the provision. Although one may never be sure of the intent of
an individual Congressman, the conduct of his colleagues who surrounded him at the time
points towards a different conclusion. See supra notes 84-101 and accompanying text.
141. 110 CONG. REc. 2804-05 (1964).
142. Brauer, supra note 56, at 55.
143. Id. See also BIRD, supra note 7, at 13 (noting that "[in the Senate], a number of
women were on the job defending the amendment.').
144. HARRISON, supra note 7, at 482.
145. Id. at 481-82. See also BIRD, supra note 7, at 14.
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SEX DISCRIMINATION
CONCLUSION
The addition of sex discrimination to the Civil Rights Act of
1964 represents one of the most significant advancements in the
battle for equality of the sexes. The provision expanded the
coverage of Title VII to millions of working women, and planted
the seed for future protections such as sexual harassment
provisions and the enactment of laws prohibiting discrimination
on the basis of pregnancy.146
The popular misreading of the legislative history of sex
discrimination provisions, however, has hampered the
development of sexual discrimination protections. By treating the
debate as a joke or last minute addition, courts and commentators
ignore its lessons and use the legislative history as little more
than an interesting anecdote. Worse, some have used the
legislative history as an argument for confining sex' discrimination
protections to only the most traditional concepts.
An examination of the history and background of the sex
discrimination provision reflects the opposite contention: genuine
efforts to further the cause of women's rights. Different factions
took advantage of the opportunity the Civil Rights Bill offered,
and strongly lobbied to add "sex" as a protected class. The NVTP
convinced Representative Smith to add the amendment in the
House. Martha Griffiths and her allies supported the measure
during debate, and lobbied for its passage when the bill entered
the Senate.
The overwhelming evidence defies the conclusion that "sex"
was added as a mere joke. The amendment represented the first
of many steps to define the broad remedial provisions of Title VII
and ensure equality in the workplace for both genders. Thus, the
prohibition against sex discrimination, and the accompanying
debate, represent one of the most important advancements
towards the goal of equality in United States history.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
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